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Abstract
While China's reforms have been successful in giving many people higher 
incomes and producing more goods and services, they also led to increasingly 
acute inequality in income and wealth among the populace. From one of the 
world's most egalitarian societies in the 1970s, today China has turned into 
one of the most unequal countries in the region and even among develop-
ing countries in general. While China's alleviation of poverty has been noth-
ing less than remarkable and seems to have greatly exceeded Target 1 of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), yet 'Impoverished China' was still 
observed to be among the 10 largest 'countries' in the world. Furthermore, 
as the geographical correlation of ethnic minority distribution and poverty 
population distribution is unmistakable, reﬂecting the composite phenomenon 
made up of rural poverty, regional poverty and ethnic poverty, ethnoregion-
alisation of poverty may present China not only with economic challenges 
but also long-term sociopolitical uncertainties. While the issue of poverty in 
China has a strong regional dimension, the size of China both demographi-
cally and geographically has led to the fact that its regional policy is always 
overshadowed by a host of complex interlinked socioeconomic, political, ethnic, 
territorial and historical factors. This paper analyses the issue of poverty in 
China as a multi-faceted phenomenon, sees poverty alleviation as inevitably 
linked to the country's regional an d minority policies, and as such, argues 
for a stronger emphasis on the elements of decentralisation and localisation.
Keywords: China, regionalism, ethnic diversity, inequalities, poverty, regional dis-
parities.
Introduction
There is a growing consensus today that the study of public policy de-
termination in the developing countries should take into consideration 
their speciﬁc, often peculiar, socio-economic milieu. This is because 
most of the obstacles they are facing now are very different from those 
experienced by today's afﬂuent, industrialised countries when they were 
at the similar stage of development in earlier days – a central fact that is 
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sometimes ignored by development economics. One of the issues that 
deserve more in-depth research is the possible impact of these countries' 
ethnic diversity upon public policy planning and implementation, the 
size of the public sector, and the State's ﬁscal functions of allocation, 
distribution, stabilisation and growth.1
The highly remarkable economic performance of the once low-in-
come, xenophobic and inward-looking state of China over the past 
three decades has attracted increasing interest from academics and 
policy-makers all over the world to the ''China miracle'' and the impact 
of such impressive achievement of the world's most populous country 
on regional and world economies. Flassbeck, Dullen and Geiger (2005) 
argued that the ability of China to both master the challenges of glo-
balisation and modernise the domestic economy at the same time has 
depended upon the strategy of unilaterally ﬁxing the exchange rate since 
1974 that was accompanied by a reform of the wage-setting regime in 
the mid-1990s, a heterodox macroeconomic demand management and 
a rather closed capital account. China's performance over the past three 
decades was no mean feat – whether in terms of the ﬁvefold increase in 
income per capita and average private consumption since the beginning 
of the reform phase in 1979, or its ability to lift over 200 million people 
out of absolute poverty (ibid.). On the other hand, in the recent govern-
ment document 'Scientiﬁc Concept of Development and Harmonious 
Society' that formed the theme of China's 17th National Congress of the 
Communist Party, 2007 (15–21 October 2007), it was reiterated that '[t]o 
coordinate development among different regions, we should promote the 
common development of all regions. Regional gaps are not only found 
between eastern China and western China, but also between provinces, 
autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the central gov-
ernment. This problem should be gradually addressed in the course of 
industrialisation, urbanisation and market development.' While brief, 
this statement reﬂects the probably understated concern of the ruling 
regime of the People's Republic of China over the widening gap in eco-
nomic development between eastern and western China, between rural 
and urban population, and between different social strata. In spite of the 
astounding economic performance – nothing short of a miracle – over the 
past few decades, China is undeniably facing acute problems on various 
fronts. For instance, agriculture accounted for only about 14.6 percent 
of China's GDP in 2003 but 49.5 percent of its labour force, while up to 
59.5 percent of the country's total population is rural. This is in addition 
to the fact that only 13 percent of China consists of arable land and the 
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country has 40 percent less arable land per capita than anywhere else in 
the world. Hence, with more people and less arable land in rural areas, 
the country has a lower comparative advantage in agriculture, and hence 
investments have been concentrated in the cities and industries and this 
has led to increasing rural-urban disparities in socioeconomic develop-
ment and income distribution (Bi 2005: 114), as well as the increasingly 
alarming socioeconomic disparity between the country's eastern, coastal 
regions and the inland, especially western, regions.
To place them in the proper perspective, such problems in develop-
ment that China is facing today could be said to be by nature the same 
ones that many other developing countries were experiencing in the 
second half of the last century and now at the beginning of this century. 
Woo et al. (2004) found that of United Nations' 15 Millennium Devel-
opment Goals (MDGs) relevant for China (targets 1-12, 15, 17-18), the 
country has already achieved 1.5, made above-average progress in 6, 
and attained satisfactory progress in 1. In summary, China is on-track 
for 8.5 targets, off-track on 4, and has made unknown progress on 
2.5. In general, China's amelioration of the poverty problem has been 
nothing less than remarkable. In 1978, China's population in poverty 
totalled 250 million. Entering the new millennium, poverty has been 
reduced to 29.27 million in 2001, 28.2 million in 2002 and 29 million by 
2003 (Figure 1), with the incidence of poverty having declined from 30 
percent to just 3.1 percent (Figure 2), according to ofﬁcial ﬁgures. (IDE 
Spot Survey, 2001, p. 54, Table 1; Chen 2006: 174)
In fact, with the rural poverty rate declining from 31.3 percent in 
1990 to 10.9 percent in 2002, China had greatly exceeded MDG's Target 
1 which only requires that the poverty rate be halved in the 1990-2015 
period (Woo et al. 2004). However, as Woo et al. (2004) noted, 'Impover-
ished China' was still one of the 10 largest 'countries' in the world.
FIGURE 1  China's Rural Poverty
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Source: Chen (2006: 174), Figure 7-1
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China's Regions
The issue of poverty in China has a strong regional dimension. The size 
of China both demographically and geographically has led to the fact 
that its regional policy is always overshadowed by a host of complex 
interlinked socioeconomic, political, ethnic, territorial and historical 
factors. A three-region demarcation of provinces, zizhiqu and zhixiashi2 
(see Table 1) has been followed since the Jiang Zemin administration in-
troduced the 'Western Regional Development' (xibu dakaifa) strategy.
The western region of China is usually divided into the northwest 
and southwest. The northwest constitutes 32 percent of the country's 
total land area, hence tops the six major regions in an oft-used six-region 
scheme (eastern – Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, 
Shandong; central south or central – Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, 
Guangxi, Hainan; north – Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Inner Mongo-
lia; northeast – Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang; southwest – Chongqing, 
Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet; northwest – Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, 
Ningxia, Xinjiang) in land area, but its population constitutes only 7 per-
cent of the national total, and in terms of population density it has only 
31 persons per km2 – far lower than the national average. Tucked deep 
in China's hinterland, the southwest constitutes more than 24 percent 
of China's land area (just smaller than the northwest), occupying the 
second place in China's six major regions. Its population is 15.7 percent 
of the national total, just next to the eastern and central south regions, 
occupying the third place. (Hu 2005: 511, 557)
FIGURE 2  China's Rural Incidence of Poverty
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Source: Zhongguo Diqu Jingji Fazhan Zhanlüe Yanjiu, 2003, p. 47, Table 3-6.
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TABLE 1   Three Economic Regions of China
Eastern 
(coastal)
Provinces of Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan, Hebei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shandong and 
Zhejiang; zhixiashi of Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin – 11 percent of China's total 
land area, 39 percent of China's total population. Transport condition advantageous, 
technological foundation relatively good, regional innovation capability strong. 
Existing problems are shortages of energy and raw material. There is urgent shortage 
of land in some places because too many pieces of land are sold too early at low 
prices.
Central
Provinces of Anhui, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Jilin and Shanxi 
– 18 percent of China's total land area, 33 percent of China's total population. Rich in 
water resources and nonferrous metal reserve. Appropriate position and important 
transport location. Agriculture advanced. Gap in comparison with eastern region 
in terms of level of economic development. In recent years, development lagged 
behind eastern and western regions. Besides, especially heavy population pressure 
led to an economic structure that relied mainly on the export of labour and energy, 
raw material. 
Western 
*
Provinces of Gansu, Guizhou, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan and Yunnan; Zhuang zizhiqu 
of Guangxi, Hui zizhiqu of Ningxia, Uygur zizhiqu of Xinjiang; Inner Mongolia zizhiqu 
and Tibet zizhiqu; Chongqing zhixiashi – 71percent of China's land area, 28 percent of 
China's total population. Immense region. Low population density. Environmentally 
fragile. Overall level of economic development backward. Nevertheless, important 
in regional geo-strategic status, with potential advantage in its rich mineral and 
energy resources. 
* Includes Guangxi (originally 'eastern') and Inner Mongolia (originally 'central').
Source: Hu (2005: 259), note 1.
Income Inequality
One of the most important changes in recent years in China's poverty 
eradication efforts is the switch of focus from absolute poverty to rela-
tive poverty. Even while the overall proportion of population in poverty 
dropped impressively from 30.7 percent in 1978 to 3.4 percent in 2000, 
according to government statistics, income inequality was increasing, 
with the Gini coefﬁcient reaching 0.415 in 1995 and continuing to rise 
(Chai et al. 2004: 2). Hence, while China's reforms have been successful 
in giving many people higher incomes and producing more goods and 
services, they also led to increasingly acute inequality in income and 
wealth among the populace. From one of the most egalitarian societies 
in the 1970s, China has turned into one of the most unequal countries 
in the region and even among developing countries in general. Bert 
Hoffman of the World Bank noted that China's Gini had risen from 0.25 
– equal to that of Germany – in 1980 to about 0.45 today, as the country 
becomes less equal than Russia or the United States of America. In the 
1980s the richest 10 percent of the people of China earned 7 times the 
income of the poorest 10 percent, today they earn more than 18 times 
as much (The Star, 21 January 2006). Or as another observer put it, 'Ever 
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since the early years of reforms, the divide between the rich and the 
poor had been emerging, and it is now getting to the stage of ripping 
the entire society apart.' (Zhou 2006:286).
Using disposable income and excluding welfare payments, Huang 
and Niu (2007) calculated that China's urban Gini coefﬁcient since 1998 
hovered between 0.4 and 0.5, showing a clear tendency towards increas-
ing income inequality. The encouraging sign was that after peaking 
in 1998, Huang and Niu actually found a slow gradual decline, albeit 
slight, in Gini from 1998 to 2003 (Figure 3). 
The peaking of Gini in 1998 was related to the rapid unbalanced 
economic growth of that period, while the signiﬁcant decline of L and 
V during that period – especially L which was lower than 0.1 for quite 
long after 1996 – was an indication of the egalitarian tendency of the 
low-income group: a general widening impoverishment (Huang and 
Niu 2007: 156).
Huang and Niu's analysis also found that, in 2003, provinces/zizhiqu/
zhixiashi whose Gini coefﬁcients (Gi) are lower than the national ﬁgure 
(G) of 0.45 totalled 20. The poor zizhiqu of Tibet was rather egalitarian, 
with Gini lower than 0.3. Other provinces/zhixiashi with a reasonable 
level of 0.3-0.4 were Shandong, Jiangxi, Hubei, Guizhou and Chong-
qing. The majority of provinces/zizhiqu/zhixiashi, totalled 23, had Gini 
levels between 0.4 and 0.5, showing the inclination towards widening 
gap between rich and poor. Two provinces, the economically advanced 
Jiangsu and Zhejiang, had Gini greater than 0.5 (ibid.: 162).
FIGURE 3 Income Inequality amongst China's Urban Population
Source: Huang and Niu (2007: 157), Table 5-1.
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Ethnicity and the Urban-Rural Disparity
Mainly engaged in traditional farming and animal husbandry, China's 
ethnic minorities have lagged behind in level of urbanisation. According 
to the 2000 Population Census, ethnic minorities' level of urbanisation 
was 23.44 percent, i.e. 13.48 percentage points lower than the national 
ﬁgure of 36.92 percent, and even 2.79 percent lower than the 1990 na-
tional level of 26.23 percent.  While the national urbanisation in terms of 
cities (chengshihua) was 23.55 percent by the year 2000 and that in terms 
of townships (chengzhenhua) was 13.37 percent – the former being 1.76 
times the latter – ethnic minorities' urbanisation in terms of cities was 
only 11.87 percent, not much different from that of 11.57 percent in terms 
of townships (Zhongguo Minzu Fazhan Baogao, 2001-2006, p. 232).
This lower urbanisation of the ethnic minorities has directly affected 
the development of their occupational structure, resulting in the major-
ity of them being engaged in the primary industry (agriculture). The 
proportion of ethnic minority population in the agricultural sector was 
82.51 percent, i.e. 7.24 percentage points higher than the national aver-
age (ibid.: 232). 
Looking at urban-rural disparity in general, due to the fact that rural 
income growth has been relatively slower and more unstable compared 
to urban income growth, the urban-rural income gap has been expand-
ing over the years.
As shown in Figure 4, during the 1980-85 period when rural income 
was growing relatively fast, the urban-rural income gap was indeed 
diminishing – from 2.5:1 in 1980 to 1.86:1 in 1985. Nevertheless, dur-
ing the subsequent decades, the ﬂuctuations in rural income growth in 
contrast with the steady urban income growth brought the urban-rural 
income gap up to the level of 2.71:1 by 1995 – which exceeded the 1980 
level – and further up to 3.22:1 by 2005. According to a national survey 
report by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, if we include in the 
computation all sorts of beneﬁts and social welfare enjoyed by the urban 
residents which are not reﬂected in their disposable income – e.g. public 
medical provisions, educational subsidies, pensions, unemployment 
insurance, subsistence subsidies – which are non-existent or extremely 
meager in the rural areas, China's urban-rural income disparity is even 
much larger – in fact, could be world's largest (Dangdai Zhongguo Shehui 
Ge Jieceng Fenxi 2007, p. 212-213).
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Ethnoregional Dimension of Poverty
In line with the now well-known fear of instability (luan) on the part of 
China's ruling Communist Party, the main objective of the country's pov-
erty alleviation policy is to prevent income and wealth inequality from 
growing out of political control, by attempting to improve the economic 
position of the poorest through considerably limited administrative 
intervention. Furthermore, discontent brewing in the areas resided by 
ethnic minorities (Figure 5)3 is taken seriously because these areas are 
also places that show a relative concentration of poor people.
Just how the western region populated by the non-Han peoples4 has 
been left behind in China's economic development is clearly indicated 
by the poverty problem. Any political or social instability in this ethnic 
minority region could have grave ramiﬁcations throughout the economy 
that would threaten the development efforts of the central government 
especially in regard to the development of the regional cores.
Figures 6 and 7 show that of the 23.65 million rural poor of China in 
2005, the eastern region, central region and western region contributed 
3.24 million (13.7 percent), 8.39 million (35.5 percent) and 12.03 million 
(50.8 percent) respectively, with the incidence of absolute poverty of the 
central region and western region being respectively 3.1 times and 6.5 
times that of the eastern region. Comparing  this with the 1993 ﬁgures 
of 19.5 percent, 31.1 percent and 49.4 percent for the eastern region, 
central region and western region respectively (Zhongguo Fazhan Baogao 
2007, p. 37), it is obvious that the changes in the regional distribution 
of the rural population in absolute poverty were mainly reﬂected in 
the decline of its proportion in the eastern region, increase of that 
FIGURE 4  China's Urban-Rural Income Gap
Source: Dangdai Zhongguo Shehui Ge Jieceng Fenxi 2007, p. 212, Table 7-2.
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in the central region, while that in the western region had remained 
largely unchanged, with the implication that the extent of decline of the 
number in absolute poverty in the eastern region actually surpassed 
the national average, that in the central region was obviously below 
the national average, and that in the western region was the same as 
the national average (ibid.).
There are four characteristics typical of the distribution of poverty 
population in China:
1. Concentration in the mountainous areas.
2. Concentration in the western region.
3. Concentration in environmentally fragile areas.
4. Concentration in ethnic minority areas.
FIGURE 5  Ethnic Diversity by Province/Zizhiqu/Zhixiashi
Notes:  Province/Zizhiqu/Zhixiashi in the ofﬁcially designated Western Region in bold italics. 
  East-West Boundary (with the central region grouped with the eastern). 
Areas with high EFI are also areas with a high concentration of ethnic minorities (or 'minority 
nationalities').
Source: Computed with data from the 2000 population census. For computation of EFI, with a range 
of 0–1 from hypothetically complete homogeneity to hypothetically perfect diversity, see Yeoh (2003: 
28). EFI for China as a whole is only 0.125, indicating high homogeneity (ibid.: 30-32, Table 1).
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FIGURE 6  China's Rural Absolute Poverty: Regional Distribution and  
 Change (1998-2005)
Source: Zhongguo Fazhan Baogao 2007, p. 38, Table 2.2.
Figure 7  China's Rural Incidence of Poverty: Regional Distribution and   
 Change (1998-2005)
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For instance, out of the 29 million people in absolute poverty in 2003, 
15.5 percent were in the eastern region, 35.5 percent in the central region, 
and 49 percent in the western region. Areas with an incidence of pov-
erty less than 1 percent were all located in the eastern region. Guangxi, 
Sichuan and Chongqing were the only places in the western region with 
incidence of poverty between 1 and 5 percent. Inner Mongolia, Yunnan, 
Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia and Xinjiang were places in the western region 
with an incidence of poverty between 5 and 10 percent. All areas with 
an incidence of poverty above 10 percent were in the western region, 
viz. Guizhou, Tibet and Qinghai. Rural populations with per capita 
incomes from 637 to 882 yuan per annum are ofﬁcially classiﬁed as the 
low-income group. In 2003, those in the low-income group totaled 29.46 
million just within the poverty counties alone. (Chen 2006: 175, footnote 
1) Combining the rural poverty population and the low-income group, 
the number in 2003 totaled 85.17 million, of which 40.14 million (47.1 
percent) were in the western region, 31.2 million (36.6 percent) in the 
central region and 13.83 million (16.2 percent) in the eastern region. 
(ibid.: 176, Figure 7-2)
In 2000, of the 592 ofﬁcially designated poverty counties5 – including 
257 ethnic minority poverty counties – 62 percent were concentrated 
in the western region. Of the 32.09 million poor in 2000, more than 
half were among the ethnic minorities (i.e. non-Han) or in the ethnic 
minority areas, totalling 17 million people. Not much had changed by 
2003, where out of the national ﬁgure of 29 million people in poverty, 
16.98 million or 58.55 percent were in the 12 zizhiqu and provinces of 
the western region. (Zhongguo Minzu Fazhan Baogao, 2001-2006: 235) 
Hence, it is discernable that there is a trend of gradual concentration of 
the poor towards the western region and the frontier areas, and towards 
the ethnic minorities. Estimation of the extent of absolute poverty among 
the ethnic minorities ranges from 40 percent of the total population as 
estimated by researchers in China to 60 percent as estimated by Nicholas 
Stern of the World Bank. In view of the fact that ethnic minorities only 
constitute 8.41 percent of China's total population, that 40 to 60 percent 
of China's poor come from them is indeed alarming. (ibid.)
One of the most crucial aspects of China's poverty problem is thus the 
very fact that the dominant component of the rural poor is the ethnic 
minorities – as mentioned above, out of the 592 poverty counties, 257 (44 
percent) are ethnic minority counties. In the year 2003, among the poor 
of the 592 poverty counties, 46.7 percent were in ethnic minority areas, 
with incidence of poverty of 11.4 percent that was higher than those 
_________________________________________________________________________37
________________________ China's Regional Policy, Poverty and the Ethnic Question
of the mountainous areas (10.1 percent), hilly areas (7.1 percent), old 
revolutionary base areas (7.7 percent) and the plains (7.8 percent). Eighty 
percent of the 4.59 million poor of Guizhou were ethnic minorities, and 
almost all of the 3.1 million hard-core poor of the province were ethnic 
minorities. In the mountainous areas of southern Ningxia, 60 percent of 
the 520,000 poor were Hui. Eighty-ﬁve percent of Yunnan's 4.4 million 
poor and more than 90 percent of Tibet's 250,000 poor were also ethnic 
minorities. (Chen 2006: 177) In fact, out of the country's 29 million pov-
erty population, 45 percent or more than 13 million were in the ethnic 
minority areas. Among the 630,000 people of 22 ethnic minority groups 
each with population less than 100,000, 394,000 were in absolute poverty 
or in the low-income category. (Wu 2006: 15)
Ofﬁcial ﬁgures by end of 2004 showed that ethnic minority areas' rural 
absolute-poverty population constituted 47.7 percent of the national 
total, incidence of poverty was 5 percentage points higher than the 
national ﬁgure. The population with low income constituted 46 percent 
of the national total, the proportion of low-income population in the 
rural population was 9 percentage points higher than the national 
ﬁgure, the absolute-poverty population plus low-income population 
constituted 46.6 percent of the national total, and the proportion of 
absolute-poverty plus low-income population in rural population was 
14 percentage points higher than the national ﬁgure. Almost 80 percent 
of China's ethnic minorities are found in the country's western region, 
especially the rural areas. China's northwest with about 20 different 
ethnic minorities and total minority population of more than 15 million 
and southwest with more than 30 ethnic minorities and total minority 
population of more than 29 million being the country's two areas with 
the most complex ethnic composition and the largest number of and 
most concentrated ethnic minorities. The geographical correlation of 
ethnic minority distribution (largely populating the frontier areas) 
and poverty population distribution is unmistakable, reﬂecting the 
composite phenomenon made up of rural poverty, geographical poverty, 
ethnic poverty and frontier poverty. (Nie and Yang 2006: 153)
Resources and the Regional Dimension
Despite the poverty problem, the importance of the western region as a 
whole – being the major energy source for the whole of China, provid-
ing 34 percent of the nation's coal, 78 percent of hydroelectricity and 59 
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percent of natural gas (Zhongguo Xibu Jingji Fazhan Baogao 2006, p. 268) 
– to the central government is undoubtedly underlined by the fact that 
it is endowed with rich mineral resources..
Almost all of the world's 160 odd known mineral resources can be 
found in China's western region. Of China's 155 mineral resources with 
already known reserve volume, 123 are found in the western region. Of 
the 60 major mineral resources, western region's 33 mineral resources 
such as potassium, phosphorus, chromium, manganese, nickel, plati-
num, strontium, etc. contribute more than half of the national reserves 
(Figure 8). In terms of scale and the crucial implication for national 
economic and social development, of the western region's energy and 
mineral resources, coal is among the most important energy resources. 
Western region's reserve volume of coal contributes more than 60 per-
cent of the national reserve, hence making the region well poised to be 
a large or ultra-large coal base for the country. According to the forecast 
of the country's geology and mineral department, China's largest long-
term coal reserve is in Xinjiang, with long-term reserve volume up to 
2.19 trillion tons, and of this, the shallow reserve (within 1000 metres) 
volume alone is already up to 900 billion tons. (Zhongguo Diqu Jingji 
Fazhan Zhanlüe Yanjiu, 2003, p. 121) The already known exploitable 
reserve volume of petroleum in the western region is almost one-ﬁfth 
of the known exploitable national reserve, that of natural gas is about 
35 percent, and that of water resource is 77 percent of the national 
reserve, while already 82 percent of the national volume of hydro-
electric power is from the western region. It has been forecast that by 
2010, northwestern region's coal, petroleum, natural gas, copper, lead, 
zinc, nickel, potassium, nitre, asbestos, sodium, etc. and southwestern 
region's aluminium, lead, zinc, phosphorus, titanium, tungsten, tin, 
antimony, strontium, quartz, silicon, asbestos, etc. will be adequate to 
guarantee the country's economic development or exports. The western 
region is poised to become China's important reserve base of strategic 
resources. (ibid.)
In September 2007, the largest gold mine in Asia was found in Wen 
county, Gansu province, with a reserve of 308 tons or about 500 billion 
yuan, capable of producing annually 10 tons or 16 billion yuan (Xingzhou 
Ribao, 16 September 2007). The poor province of Gansu as the treasure 
trove of China, though sounding paradoxical, is indisputable. More 
remarkable are the large mineral reserves in the ethnic minority area 
of the province. In the ethnic minority area that constitutes just about 
38.7 percent of Gansu province, the conﬁrmed mineral reserves consist 
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of 68 types, found at more than 630 locations (Chen 2004: 84). Gansu's 
main minerals include coal (with a reserve of 407.179 million tons), 
marble (4.21 billion m3), iron, gold, asbestos (one-third of total national 
production per annum, with a reserve of 26.8 million tons), chromium 
FIGURE 8  Distribution of Mineral Reserves
Source: Zhongguo Diqu Jingji Fazhan Zhanlüe Yanjiu, 2003, p. 122, Table 7-4.
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(industrial reserve ranking number 2 nationally), uranium, tungsten, 
nickel, etc. and there is a large reserve of uranium in Gansu's Tibetan 
zizhizhou ('autonomous prefecture') of Gannan, with about 300 locations, 
5 already conﬁrmed, with a reserve of 196.7 tons (ibid.: 84-85).
The Environmental Dimension of Interregional Imbalance
Woo et al. (2004) found that China appeared to be off track to achieve the 
MDG Target 9 with the proportion of land covered by forest amount-
ing to 17.5 percent in 2001, only slightly increased from 15.6 percent in 
1990. This does not auger well for China's continued effort to solve its 
poverty problem. The reality is that poverty in this large country is still 
very much related to environmental factors. For instance, the concen-
tration of the poor in the western region is related to the fact that the 
poverty-stricken mountainous areas are concentrated in this particular 
region. The country's 64.8 percent of poverty-stricken mountainous 
areas (shanqu) and 56.2 percent of the hilly (qiuling) areas are found in 
10 provinces/zizhiqu/zhixiashi of the western region, occupying 72.9 
percent of the total area of the region, with mountainous areas alone 
taking up 53.1 percent. The most mountainous provinces are the three 
southwest provinces of Sichuan (including Chongqing), Yunnan and 
Guizhou, with mountainous areas taking up 72 percent, 80.3 percent 
and 80.8 percent of the respective total areas of the said provinces. If 
inclusive of the hilly areas, the ﬁgure rises to 95 percent for Yunnan 
and Guizhou, and 97.5 percent for Sichuan. (Chen 2006: 176; original 
source: Zhongguo Shanqu Fazhan Baogao 2003, pp. 246-247) Out of the 592 
poverty counties, 366 are in the western region, and out of these 366 
counties, 258 are remote mountain counties, occupying about 70 per-
cent of the western mountain counties. Most of these poverty counties 
are distributed over 6 major areas of fragile environmental habitat, viz. 
Inner Mongolian plateau's southeastern border area that suffers from 
desertiﬁcation, Huangtu plateau's gully area that suffers from severe 
soil erosion, the environmentally deteriorating mountainous areas of 
the Qin Ba region, the environmentally endangered hilly areas of the 
karst plateau, the sealed-off mountain and valley areas of the Hengduan 
range and the severely cold mountain areas of the western deserts. Be-
ing environmentally fragile and sensitive, all these are areas extremely 
short of resources, with extremely bad environment for human habita-
tion. (Chen 2006: 177) 
_________________________________________________________________________41
________________________ China's Regional Policy, Poverty and the Ethnic Question
There are three main issues in the western region's environmental 
degradation: soil erosion, desertiﬁcation and grassland deterioration. 
Major symptoms like the increasingly serious Yellow River drought 
since the 1990s, the severe ﬂood of mid-Yangzi River in 1998, and the 
almost yearly spring sandstorm since 2000 all point to the critical stage 
of environmental degradation of the western region. For instance, the 
ﬁrst sandstorm of 2008 came in March from the Gobi desert, affecting 
not only up to 110 million people in China's 300 cities, towns and coun-
ties in 5 provinces/zizhiqu, but also adjacent nations including Korea, 
Japan and Taiwan, straining bilateral relations. Such sandstorms from 
China are costing, besides human lives, an estimated US$5.82 billion of 
losses in Korea alone. (Dongfang Ribao, 4 March 2008)
Up to 80 percent of the country's total area of soil erosion, 81.43 percent 
of the area of desertiﬁcation and 93.27 percent of the area of grassland 
deterioration are in the western region. (Chen 2006: 19; original source: 
Zhongguo Quyu Fazhan Baogao 2000)  The desertiﬁcation of farmland in 
the western region involves a total area of up to 1.1 million hectares. 
While this is only 2.24 percent of the total area of farmland in the western 
region, it contributes to 43.24 percent of the national total area of deser-
tiﬁcation of farmland – that suffering from light- and medium-degree 
desertiﬁcation is 87.95 percent of the national total area and that suffering 
from high-degree desertiﬁcation is 12.05 percent of the national total 
area. Provinces/zizhiqu in the western region particularly severely hit 
by desertiﬁcation are Xinjiang, Qinghai, Gansu and Tibet. (Chen 2006: 
20) With the 'Western Regional Development' strategy inevitably aim-
ing at exploiting the rich natural resources (water, nonferrous metals, 
petroleum, natural gas, etc.) of the western region, both to promote the 
region's economic growth and enhance the living standard and welfare 
of the region's inhabitants, and to meet the energy needs of the country 
as a whole, in time there could arise an inherent contradiction between 
habitat construction/environmental protection and the basic aim of xibu 
dakaifa that cannot be ignored. (ibid.: 33)
The western region is the country's main region of grassland 
deterioration. Figure 9 shows that the pasture grasslands of Tibet, Gansu 
and Sichuan have been deteriorating very rapidly in the last 20 years. 
Tibet's area of deterioration was 24.267 million hectares in 1980, with a 
deterioration rate of 29.6 percent. The deterioration area rose to 29.285 
million hectares by 2000, with a deterioration rate of 35.7 percent, i.e. 
an increase of 6 percentage points in 20 years. Gansu's area of deteriora-
tion was 2.351 million hectares in 1980, with a deterioration rate of 26.7 
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percent. The deterioration area rose to 4.405 million hectares by 2000, 
with a deterioration rate of 50.0 percent, i.e. an increase of 23.3 percentage 
points in 20 years. Sichuan's area of deterioration was only 1.333 million 
hectares in 1980, with a deterioration rate of only 9.8 percent. However, 
the deterioration area tripled within 20 years and rose to 4.541 million 
hectares by 2000, with a rapid rise in deterioration rate to 33.3 percent. 
Qinghai's area of deterioration was 4.398 million hectares in 1980, with 
a deterioration rate of 12.1 percent. The deterioration area rose to 20.367 
million hectares by 2000, with deterioration rate increased tremendously 
to 56 percent, i.e. a shocking increase of 44 percentage points in 20 years. 
(ibid.: 22-23)
Adding to these problems, there is an alarming degree of wastage and 
environmental damage in resource exploitation in the western region, 
the former being partly due to the fact that the right of exploitation is 
given by the government via administrative measures, hence does not 
FIGURE 9   Grassland Deterioration in Tibet, Qinghai, Gansu and Sichuan
Source: Chen (2006: 22-23), Tables 1-6, 1-7, 1-8, 1-9 (original source: Deng, 2005: 128-130).
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feature in the enterprises' cost structure. Furthermore, resource tax by 
production volume is as low as just 1.18 percent of resource volume on 
average. Zero cost of access to resources and extremely low resource tax 
have thus led to tremendous wastage in exploitation. For instance, for 
some oil wells in northern Shaanxi, only around 100 kilograms could 
be extracted from every ton of crude oil reserve, the other more than 
800 kilograms being completely wasted. (Zhongguo Xibu Jingji Fazhan 
Baogao 2006, p. 272)  Such over-exploitation and wastage, coupled with 
neglect of environmental protection, have also led to increasingly severe 
environmental degradation. For instance, in Shaanxi's Shenmu county, 
over-exploitation by the county's 216 coal enterprises has resulted in a 
cavity of up to 99.12 km2 in size, leading to 19 cave-ins. Cave-ins, death 
of plant life due to the drying up of groundwater, and severe water and 
air pollution are making the mining regions increasingly uninhabitable. 
It was reported that while caving-ins are making land uncultivable for 
farmers and causing grazing problems for animal husbandry, and di-
minishing groundwater is drying up wells which households depend 
on for drinking water, the mining company is paying villagers a cave-in 
compensation of just Rmb 20 cents for every ton of coal. (ibid.: 272-273)
Illiteracy, Illness and the Poverty Trap
An important factor that is behind the interregional differential in 
economic performance is the education level of the labour force. The 
western farming region in general suffers from the problem of shorter 
schooling years and hence the relatively high percentage of illiteracy 
and semi-illiteracy in the total labour force (Figure 10).
In short, in terms of the illiteracy and semi-literacy rate and the 
proportion of labour with only primary education level, the western 
region far exceeded the eastern and central regions, while in terms 
of the proportion with higher education levels the western region 
lagged far behind the eastern and central regions. This problem was 
particularly serious in the ethnic regions like Tibet and Qinghai. The 
illiterate constituted 58.42 percent of Tibet's labour force, those with 
only primary education amounting to 41 percent, those with only pri-
mary education or lower amounting to 99.42 percent, far exceeding the 
national average of 37.75 percent (Zhongguo Xibu Nongcun Quanmian 
Xiaokang Zhibiao Tixi Yanjiu, 2006, p. 71-72). In fact, relatively high il-
literacy has always been a problem for China's non-Han nationalities, 
and is adversely affecting the development of minority areas. While 
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ofﬁcial ﬁgures showed that the minorities' adult (age 15 years and 
above) illiteracy rate had fallen remarkably from 30.68 percent in 1990 
to 14.54 percent in 2000, the latter was still 5.46 percentage points higher 
than the national level of 9.08 percent, and the illiterate adults (10.996 
million people) among the minorities constituted 12.64 percent of the 
China's total illiterate adult population. The problem was worse for the 
female adults of the minorities, with an illiteracy rate of 20.41 percent, 
compared to 8.92 percent for the male. (Zhongguo Minzu Fazhan Baogao, 
2001-2006, p. 231)
According to the 2000 ofﬁcial ﬁgures, only 10.59 percent (11.065 mil-
lion) of the total minority population had had higher secondary schooling 
and above, i.e. 4.08 percentage points lower than the national ﬁgure of 
14.67 percent; while 2.49 percent of the total minority population had 
had higher tertiary education and above, i.e. 1.06 percentage points 
lower than the national ﬁgure of 3.54 percent. The above ﬁgures actually 
reﬂect the basic problem of the backwardness of foundation education 
among the minority nationalities. Ofﬁcial statistics show that there are 
13 minority nationalities with years of schooling less than 5, the lowest 
being the Dongxiang (a Muslim minority) with just 2.6 years. (ibid: 
FIGURE 10  China's Interregional Differentials in Education Level of  
  Labour Force
Source: Zhongguo Xibu Nongcun Quanmian Xiaokang Zhibiao Tixi Yanjiu, 2006, p. 72, Table 5-1.
0
01
02
03
04
05
06
 fo tnec rep
ecroF ruobaL
ro etaretillI
ot esolc
etaretilli
rewoL
yradnoces
elddiM
yraitret
)nauhzgnohz(
egareva nretsaE egareva lartneC egareva nretseW egareva lanoitaN
_________________________________________________________________________45
________________________ China's Regional Policy, Poverty and the Ethnic Question
231) Furthermore, with lower level of health service and hygiene and 
standard of living, the ethnic minority areas of western China also suffer 
from high risk of local diseases and epidemics like AIDS, high infant 
mortality rate and lower health. While the national average life expect-
ancy in 2000 was 71.40 years, the ofﬁcial ﬁgure was 67.41 in Xinjiang, 
66.03 in Qinghai, 65.96 in Guizhou, 65.49 in Yunnan and 64.37 in Tibet, 
respectively, which ranked the ﬁve lowest in life expectancy among the 
provinces and zizhiqu of China (ibid.).
Figure 11 shows the astounding gap in consumption expenditures in 
the rural areas between Shanghai, Jiangxi and Guizhou in 2001. It can 
be seen that Shanghai's expenditure per capita on health and medical 
treatment was 3.66 times Jiangxi's, and 8.59 times that of Guizhou. 
In terms of medical costs, Nie and Yang (2006: 290-291) gave the 
average hospitalisation cost per peasant as 2236 yuan according to the 
2003 Ministry of Health ﬁgures while the net income per capita of peas-
ants was just 2622 yuan. This means that once hospitalised, a peasant's 
medical expenses would be almost equivalent to his/her annual income. 
A severe illness would cost on average a peasant's total income of 3 to 
4 years. As a result, in the poor mountainous areas of western China, 
as high as 72 percent of peasants who are ill are not seeking formal 
FIGURE 11  Regional Disparity in Rural Consumption Expenditure, 2001  
  (yuan)
Source: Zhongguo Nongcun Jingji Fenxi he Zhengce Yanjiu (2003-2006), p. 223, Table 11. 
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medical help and 89 percent of peasants who should be hospitalised 
are not hospitalised (ibid., 291). A government survey conducted in 
2004 showed that the major reason for peasants' burden of debt was 
illness (Figure 12).
FIGURE 12  Reasons for Peasants' Indebtedness in China
Source: Nie and Yang (2006: 292), Table 7-6.
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Poverty, Unemployment and Social Instability
A main issue of concern for the ruling regime of China ensuing from 
the combined effects of a persistent high incidence of poverty, widening 
income gap and rising unemployment as well as the increasing evidence 
of the ethno-regionalisation of poverty is undoubtedly the threat of social 
instability. It was reported that in 2005 public order disturbances rose 
by 6.6 percent to 87,000, or an average of almost 240 a day (The Star, 21 
May 2006). Statistics further revealed that there were 94,000 large-scale 
protests and demonstrations in 2006, involving more than 500,000 peo-
ple – an alarming increase from the statistics of 2005 (Dongfang Ribao, 
4 March 2008). Poverty has also led to increasing crime such as drug 
trafﬁcking, especially in various parts of Sichuan, Ningxia, Guizhou 
and Gansu, reﬂected in such popular sayings like 'Xia Yunnan shang 
qianxian, yi lai yi qu ji shi wan, sha le naodai ye qingyuan [To Yunnan 
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to the battleﬁeld, earning tens of thousands in just one trip – something 
really willing to die for]', and in many cases drug trafﬁcking has turned 
into a family business: 'Sha le laozi erzi gan, sha le zhangfu qizi gan 
[Father's killed, son taking over; husband's killed, wife taking over]' 
(Nie and Yang 2006: 193). In other words, drug trafﬁcking is seen as a 
risk worth taking to escape a life of abject poverty.
Equally alarming is a series of unrests with an ethno-religious or 
ethno-regional content or a mix of the two. A most notable of such 
incidents is the Han-Hui conﬂict in October 2004 that occurred in the 
Nanren village and two other nearby villages in Henan province's 
Zhongmou county, which allegedly killed more than 100 people includ-
ing at least 15 policemen, and injured more than 400 people, and at one 
point threatened to draw thousands more into the frenzy (Pocha 2004).6 
Though the conﬂict was probably triggered by a local trafﬁc accident and 
rooted in strong historical-cultural factors including perceived overall 
Han dominance and a backlash against certain preferential policies for 
the ethnic minorities, simmering tensions might have been exacerbated 
by China's economic success that led to a growing gap between rich 
and poor, especially in the countryside. Other than the Nanren conﬂict, 
there was also the unconﬁrmed news of another serious Han-Hui con-
ﬂict in August 2007 in the Shimiao township in the Huimin county of 
Shandong province, close to the Hui county of Shanghe, that resulted 
in at least one death and more than twenty injured. This was not the 
ﬁrst such open conﬂict in Shandong which earlier experienced the well-
known 'Yangxin incident' in 2000 when six Huis were killed during a 
thousand-strong Hui protest against a 'Qingzhen Zhurou [halal pork]' 
shop sign. (Xingzhou Ribao, 5 September 2007)
The combined impact of poverty, unemployment, inter-ethnic in-
equalities and ethno-regional disparities hence represents one of the 
major challenges facing China's ruling regime in maintaining social 
stability for continued rapid economic development that is now increas-
ingly seen as the key to the survival of its one-party rule. 
As the incidents of socio-racial conﬂict in Henan and Shandong cited 
above testiﬁed, a general increase in unrest in rural areas might also 
have been fuelled by dissatisfaction over poverty and corruption, per-
ceived inequality in the distribution of resources in favour of the Han, 
and backlashes against certain preferential policies for the minorities 
(Pocha 2004; news.bbc.co.uk 2004). Then there is the long-running, sim-
mering tension and hostility in Xinjiang and Tibet, where especially in 
Xinjiang, it had increasingly been taking on a mixed ethno-religious 
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and ethno-territorial ﬂavour, with the increasing undertone of ethnic 
separatism. Furthermore, contemporary studies on intergroup relations 
often see ethnicity not as a 'given' of social existence, but as a political 
construct linked directly to power relations and resource competition, 
and 'it is as an instrument for political mobilisation that ethnicity often 
plays a key role in the interplay between group activities and public 
policy' (Yeoh 2008: 81). While the vast ethnic minority area that covers 
Shaanxi, Ningxia, Gansu, Qinghai and Xinjiang continues to lag further 
and further behind the rest of the country since market-oriented eco-
nomic reforms were introduced in the late 1970s, the realisation by the 
central government in Beijing lately that the region is the treasure trove 
of mineral wealth has probably helped to change its attitude towards the 
area. It could be argued that as a political urgency China has no choice 
but to give due politico-economic consideration to its western region 
– a region populated by many ethnic minorities and having alarmingly 
lagged behind during the market-oriented reforms – for the sake of 
sociopolitical stability that is deemed crucial to the security of the Chi-
nese state. Such concerns were obviously behind the 'Western Regional 
Development' strategy which at ﬁrst seemed to be an easy way for Jiang 
Zemin to assert his authority ahead of the 16th Party Congress sched-
uled for the autumn of 2002, in parallel with thought control through 
ideological and political work. While the strategy would cover many 
minority zizhiqu whose majority population are ethno-linguistically 
and/or ethno-religiously distinctive from the Han Chinese central State, 
the plan has always been understood to be a political process to allocate 
pieces of the economic pie to the local governments in the western region 
but not about political decentralisation that usually goes hand in hand 
with democratisation.
In short, when Jiang Zemin stressed the need for 'national unity' in pro-
posing the 'Western Regional Development' strategy, he simply conveyed 
the government's understanding of the need for different approaches in 
economic development strategy for the eastern and western regions due 
to the contrasting ethnic compositions of the two regions – a recognition 
of the fact that while the eastern region is demographically dominated by 
the Han Chinese, the western region is home to a large number of China's 
ethnic minorities, and compounding the exigencies engendered by the 
ethnic factor is the socioeconomic disparity between the regions.
However, implementing the 'Western Regional Development' project 
within such a cautious political framework is not without risks either. 
First, with strong constraints in the devolution of central power, it 
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could be difﬁcult to coordinate the interests of the central and local 
governments over the power of authorisation and permissions and to 
determine how far the right to independent development could go. 
Besides that, it may not be easy to adjust the interests of local govern-
ments over limited ﬁnancial resources and projects to be implemented. 
Finally, there is the fact that 80 percent of the ethnic minorities in China 
live in the western region and national border areas where the new 
regional development strategy is targeted. Without accompanying 
decentralisation of political power and the conferring of a substantial 
degree of regional autonomy in the control and use of local resources, 
ethnic minorities may perceive the central State's projects as attempts 
at internal colonisation, leading to their outright opposition to the 
whole regional development strategy itself, thus exacerbating the al-
ready simmering ethno-regional tensions. Such pitfalls can have real 
consequences for the success or failure of the strategy. For instance, 
in July 2000 the World Bank rejected a loan to China – a US$40 mil-
lion interest-free loan intended to ﬁnance a plan to move 58000 Han 
Chinese living in Qinghai to the province's Tibetan area as part of the 
poverty relief measures – after U.S.-based Tibet support groups and 
environmentalist groups, and reportedly China's own ethnic minority, 
campaigned against the loan project, arguing about the possible threat 
to Tibetan inﬂuence and culture. The World Bank's board of governors 
ﬁnally rejected the proposed loan after the bank's examinations discov-
ered the lack of both stringent standards for environmental assessment 
and of secrecy about hearings with residents of the area where the Han 
Chinese were to be moved (IDE Spot Survey, 2001, p. 27).
So far, measures to improve the investment environment in the west-
ern region under the 'Western Regional Development' strategy include 
assistance directed at solid targets like infrastructure and those aimed 
at soft targets such as business environment. In a way, measures and 
practices that had been tested in the eastern, coastal region in the past 
few decades of reform are now being transplanted to the western region. 
Within this framework, the western region was granted in 2000 (for ten 
years till 2010) a preferential company income tax rate of only 15 percent 
– the same rate long enjoyed by enterprises in the eastern region – and 
the power to approve foreign investment projects in service industries 
was conferred on the relevant authorities in the western region. Other 
measures include the issue of on-the-spot visas to foreign tourists to 
enhance tourism, and the adjustment of prices of minerals and railway 
transport. (Zhou 2006: 260).
50 ____________________ The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 26(2)•2008
Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh ______________________________________________________
Despite all this, there are also geopolitical factors that could make or 
break the reform efforts – for instance, the opening up of new trading 
routes to regional and world markets remains as important today as in 
ancient times. To give a case in point: the success of regional develop-
ment policy in southwestern China – Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan and 
Chongqing – could depend much upon such routes via the Indian Ocean 
and South Asia, which serves to explain much China's current foreign 
policy towards the military regime in Burma (Arnott 2001: 81), apart 
from  China's coveting of Burma's mineral and other natural resources 
to fuel its breakneck development and its wariness of the implication 
of foreign pressure on the Burmese junta's political repression by its 
own one-party rule (Figure 13).7 Furthermore, from the geopolitical 
perspective, China's support for Burma's ruling military regime aims 
at securing sea lines of communication as an alternative route to the In-
dian Ocean via Burma's strategic coastline bordering the Andaman Sea 
which would also provide China a foothold near the territorial waters 
of India, its traditional rival.
Beyond such geopolitical issues, it has been observed how the major 
challenges presently facing China's central government actually come 
Notes:
1 is the best rating, 7 the worst. Ratings are for 1st December 2005 – 31st December 2006.
*  Xizang (Tibet) Zizhiqu ('autonomous region'), China
+  Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR), China
Source: Data from Freedom House (2007).
FIGURE 13       China, Taiwan and ASEAN: Political Rights and Civil Liberties
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from within China itself, as manifest in the increasing number of pro-
tests that have erupted all over the country lately over issues like local 
government corruption, industrial disputes – including the loss of lives 
due to the too frequent mining accidents – and residential dislocation 
due to dam constructions or property development. While public pro-
tests with the scale of the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations seem remote, 
the increasingly anachronistic Communist one-party regime ultimately 
stakes its survival upon the continued robust economic growth and the 
effectiveness of authoritarian power (China Goes Global, 2005: 15, edito-
rial), and how well it takes upon the task of redressing the mounting 
grievances simmering across China engendered by decades of uneven 
development since its headlong plunge into market-oriented reform, 
many of which carry increasingly worrying ethnic or ethno-regional 
overtones. However, many studies have forecast that it will take several 
decades for the economic disparity between the eastern, coastal regions 
and the inland, especially western, regions to start narrowing. One such 
study was conducted by the Institute of Quantitative and Technical 
Economics of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and predicted 
that absolute disparity would gradually begin to narrow between 2010 
and 2030, but until then, the gap is estimated to widen further (IDE 
Spot Survey, 2001, p. 63). It therefore remains to be seen whether the 
country's continued war on poverty, building on its remarkable success 
of the last few decades, would carry adequate momentum to uplift the 
standard of livelihood of the majority of its populace, especially rural, 
and in particular its volatile ethnic western region, supported by the 
maintenance of continual robust economic growth, so as to hold off or 
delay the inevitable challenges to the regime's one-party rule and to 
keep the 'creeping democratization'8 process in check.
Concluding Remarks
As poverty and inequality constitute one of the most, if not the most, 
critical challenges China faces in its next phase of politico-socioeconomic 
development, and as has been noted earlier, poverty in China has the 
properties of being concentrated in the western region and in the eth-
nic minority areas, ethnoregionalisation of poverty inevitably ensues, 
presenting China not only with economic challenges but also long-term 
sociopolitical security risks. Furthermore, if poverty could be seen as a 
multiconcept construct, it is pertinent that all crucial dimensions – re-
gional, ethnic, urban vs. rural, environmental, resource exploitation, 
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literacy, health care, employment, industrial structure and economic 
openness, etc. – of this problem would have to be given due emphasis 
in any policy response.
These dimensions are not isolated, but intricately linked in a complex 
nexus of causes and effects. Such multidimensional nexus is reﬂected 
in what Han (2006) referred to as the 'three highs, three lows' economy 
of China. The 'three highs' she referred to are high material consump-
tion, high external demand and high accumulation and investment rate, 
and the 'three lows' are low per capita economic growth, low internal 
demand and low consumption rate. China's high growth is built upon 
the foundation of high material consumption, hence, according to its, 
is unsustainable. For instance, in 2003, with a GDP growth rate of 10.1 
percent, China's cement consumption was 820 million ton, i.e. half of 
the world's total consumption of cement; its coal consumption was 1.5 
billion ton, i.e. one third of the world's total consumption of coal; and 
its steel consumption was 260 million ton, i.e. one quarter of the world's 
total consumption of steel. Quite a signiﬁcant portion of this growth 
could be attributed to blind investments and low-quality repetitive con-
struction, resulting in product surplus, resource waste, energy shortage 
and environmental pollution. Furthermore, such extra-high growth rate 
must to a certain extent have been obtained by sacriﬁcing fairness and 
equality. Without appropriate governmental macroeconomic manage-
ment, unconstrained concentration in resource ﬂow towards cities and 
other advanced regions with high returns to capital has resulted in the 
sluggish development of rural and other remote areas, leading to the 
ever-widening urban-rural and interregional development gap. Extra-
high economic growth vis-à-vis inadequate purchasing power of the 
society especially the lower-income group has resulted in the relative 
shortage in domestic demand and supply-demand imbalance. While 
the government's macroeconomic management may ensure a soft land-
ing, its effect is more short-term rather than long-term and plays little 
role in arresting the widening gap between rich and poor and ensuring 
long-term price stability (ibid.: 204-205). The solving of the remaining 
problems of poverty and inequality, still daunting despite the impres-
sive achievements in the last few decades, in this great nation has duly 
been the focus of researchers and policymakers, whether the policy 
suggestions, to give a few examples, be in the form of implementing 
programmes that strengthen the three mechanisms of income conver-
gence (i.e. free movement of goods, people and capital), that provide 
infrastructure, that focus on rural poverty and that mobilise the univer-
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sities for growth (Woo 2004), or increasing overall public investment in 
rural areas, increasing public investment in agricultural R&D, in rural 
education, in rural infrastructure, in improving the efﬁciency of existing 
public irrigation systems, as well as improving the targeting of funds to 
the poor and increasing ﬁscal transfers from the richer coastal region to 
the poorer western regions, in view of the country's decentralised ﬁscal 
system and the western region's small tax base (Fan et al. 2002: 50-51). 
On the other hand, Zhongguo Fazhan Baogao 2007 suggested nine points 
of establishing the 'developmental poverty line' standard to readjust 
long-term poverty alleviation policy, establishing a poverty alleviation 
credit system and ways for private ﬁnance institutions to participate 
in poverty alleviation, establishing a sound social security system both 
urban and rural, advancing the progress of urbanisation and the provi-
sion of social security and public services to rural-to-urban migrants, 
providing more equitable educational opportunity, expanding human 
resource development (including skill training and re-training) for rural 
labour, improving rural medical services, establishing a rational public 
ﬁnance system and strengthening public governance for poverty alle-
viation, and enhancing the role of non-governmental organisations in 
poverty alleviation (Zhongguo Fazhan Baogao 2007, pp. 174-182).
While the above, just a few summarised suggestions among the count-
less policy recommendations from local and international researchers 
and think tanks working on poverty alleviation in the world's most 
populous country, did cover the main foci crucial to China's problems 
of poverty and inequality, there is still an aspect that needs special 
emphasis, i.e. ethnicity, and its related issue of ethnoterritoriality. The 
fact that China is technically speaking, if one follows the critical mass 
approach9, not a multiethnic country, with the majority Han constitut-
ing 92 percent of the population, often obscures the fact that the ethnic 
minorities are huge in absolute numbers – about 110 million in total, 
including the 16 million Zhuang, 10 million Manchu, 9 million Hui, 8 
million Uygurs, 5 million Mongols and 5 million Tibetans – although 
they are practically dwarfed almost to invisibility by the sheer size of 
the Han population. Although the race-neutral10 policy of the Chinese 
State does contain certain elements of afﬁrmative action in favour of the 
minorities, given the fact that poverty is still highly concentrated in the 
ethnic minority areas and ethnic regions in western China which are 
clearly disadvantaged for both historical (being manyi – i.e. 'barbarians' 
– marginalised by centuries of Han-Chinese imperial expansion) and 
geographical (e.g. terrains which are mountainous, desertiﬁed, envi-
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ronmentally fragile) reasons, the ethnic aspect of poverty alleviation 
programmes is evident. The highly remarkable extent of ﬁscal decen-
tralisation, albeit unaccompanied by political decentralisation (see Yeoh 
2007) that usually goes hand in hand with democratization, that exists 
in China should be further enhanced to aid the effort at poverty alle-
viation, especially in the context of the ethnoregional dimension of the 
poverty problem. In recent years, local and international organisations 
around the world are increasingly advocating decentralisation to bring 
about more effective poverty reduction, with both the direct effects on 
the regional targeting of transfers and the indirect effects of overcom-
ing the inefﬁciency in local public services and hampered economic 
growth related to sub-optimal decentralisation (von Braun and Grote 
2000: 2). Although theoretically there may not be a clear-cut function-
ing relationship between decentralisation and poverty reduction, most 
research ﬁndings in recent years deﬁnitely pointed to the positive. Von 
Braun and Grote (2000) pointed out that political, administrative and 
ﬁscal decentralisations need to be considered simultaneously, and the 
sequencing and pace of these three aspects of decentralisation seem 
to play an important role in impacting poverty reduction. While ﬁscal 
decentralisation shows ambivalent effects for poverty reduction and 
administrative decentralisation alone does not add power and voice 
to the poor, 'political decentralisation often beneﬁts the poor, because 
involving civil society in planning, monitoring and evaluating public 
programs and policies is crucial to ensure steady progress and that is 
facilitated in a decentralised system' (ibid.: 25-26), or, as the USAID report 
Fighting Poverty through Fiscal Decentralisation (January 2006: 2) pointed 
out, 'if the increasingly accepted wisdom that 'all poverty is local' is 
correct, then decentralisation policy and poverty reduction strategies 
could be closely intertwined and have synergetic positive effects on 
each other'11. Kyei (2000), in his study on the case of Ghana, concluded 
that the rural poor in Ghana could only beneﬁt with a much stronger 
commitment from the central government to decentralisation, especially 
in terms of powersharing and ﬁnancial provision. Vijayanand (2001), in 
his paper on the Kerala state of India, noted various advantages of de-
centralisation in terms of poverty reduction including the greater reach 
of resources with earmarking of funds for the disadvantaged groups, 
less sectoralism in decentralised programmes with greater convergence 
contributing to the reduction in the ratchet effect of poverty, greater 
emphasis on locally appropriate and affordable solutions, greater real-
ism in tackling problems of poverty, improved accountability, etc. while 
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decentralisation 'affords opportunities to the poor to grow in strength 
by continuous participation (learning by doing), constant observa-
tion of the exercise of power (learning by seeing) and accessing more 
information (learning by knowing)' (p. 23). Hence, given the crucial 
ethnoregional dimension of China's poverty problem, it is pertinent that 
the poverty alleviation effort of the country should beneﬁt from any 
possible progress in decentralisation – ﬁscal, administrative, and most 
importantly, political – since decentralised governments, due to their 
closeness both institutionally (e.g. ethnically) and spatially to citizens 
in the regional/rural areas, could be more responsive to the needs of 
the poor than the central government and hence are more likely to suc-
cessfully formulate and implement pro-poor policies and programmes 
in these regions and areas.
Dr. Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh is Director and Associate Professor, Institute 
of China Studies, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 
(emileyeo@gmail.com).
NOTES
1   For instance, in Malaysia, the impact of ethnic diversity has been inseparable from 
public policy planning and implementation, and it has left an indelible mark upon 
the remarkable growth of the public sector, particularly since the promulgation of 
the New Economic Policy in 1970.
2   Zizhiqu – ''autonomous region''; zhixiashi – municipality directly ruled by the central 
government.
3  The ethnic fractionalisation index (EFI, see Yeoh 2003: 28) used to show provincial 
ethnic diversity is constructed through the computational procedure of Rae and Tay-
lor's index of fragmentation (F), deﬁned as the probability that a randomly selected 
pair of individuals in a society will belong to different groups (Rae and Taylor 1970: 
22-3). The index varies from 0 to 1. The value is zero for a completely homogeneous 
country (the probability of belonging to different groups is nil). The value 1 occurs 
in the hypothetical society where each individual belongs to a different group. The 
fragmentation index is identical to Rae's measure of party system fractionalisation 
(Rae 1967: 55-8) and Greenberg's measure of linguistic diversity (Greenberg 1956).
4  The ofﬁcial population ﬁgures for Tibet differ much from certain unofﬁcial ones. The 
ofﬁcial ﬁgures have been disputed by the Tibetan government-in-exile who claims that 
'accelerating Han population transfer into Tibet … has reduced the Tibetan people 
to a minority in their own land … [and today] there are over 7.5 million non-Tibetan 
settlers in Tibet including Chinese and Hui Muslims, compared to six million Tibetans' 
(Cook and Murray 2001: 141). However, such allegations of population transfer is 
rebutted by the Beijing government, who argues that 'the only Han Chinese living in 
Tibet are specialists who have gone there voluntarily to help in the region's develop-
ment … [and they] make up less than ﬁve percent of the population and many of the 
people are there for only a few years before returning home' (ibid.).
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5  As the applicant of poverty relief fund and the last user of the funds, the county 
(xian) is the most important and basic unit in the work of poverty alleviation (Chai 
et al. 2004: 16).
6  As usual, due to press restraints, casualty ﬁgures as such can never be veriﬁed.
7  In the 2007 Freedom House's Annual Global Survey of Political Rights and Civil 
Liberties, China was rated 7 (i.e. the worst rating) on political rights and 6 (next 
to worst) on civil liberties, making her one of the 17 'worst of the worst' countries 
in terms of political rights and civil liberties (Puddington 2007: 4), just marginally 
better than Burma, North Korea, Cuba, Sudan, Libya, Somalia, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan that were all rated 7 on both political rights and civil liberties (Freedom 
in the World 2007. The ratings are for 1 December 2005 – 31 December 2006).
8  See Pei (1995).
9  According to the 'critical mass' theory – advanced, among others, by Semyonov and 
Tyree (1981) – societies are considered multiethnic only if minorities constitute more 
than ten percent of their population.
10  Afﬁrmative action and preferential treatment are 'race-conscious' and 'group-cen-
tred' strategies in contexts where the dominant policy form, particularly in liberal 
democracies, is individual-centred and 'colour-blind' (Edwards 1994: 55).
11  'Poverty is local and it can only be fought at the local level' (UNCHR 1999).
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